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Labor relations in the Netherlands are subject to an intensive system of
negotiations between employer associations, trade unions, and the gov-
ernment. Every year, starting at a centralized level, these three parties dis-
cuss the economic developments, aiming for agreement on the desirable
development of wages. Moderate development of wages to stimulate em-
ployment growth has always been an important theme in these negotia-
tions. This agreement serves as advice for negotiations between union and
employers’ associations at industry level. Collective agreements in indus-
tries are generally extended by the Minister of Social Aﬀairs, which means
that the agreement applies to all workers and ﬁrms within the industry and
also to those who are not represented by a trade union or employer asso-
ciation.
This structure suggests that wage development is highly centralized and
focused on wage moderation. In contrast, the Dutch labor market also has
clearly individualized features. Union membership is low, a high share of
employment is in the service sector, while the fraction of workers in the tra-
ditionally much more organized industry is small. A large fraction of ﬁrms
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van der Poel for their support in accessing and using the data.explicitly apply some kind of performance pay, and in many more ﬁrms,
managers have performance interviews with their employees, which may
lead to extra wage increases or promotion. Even in the public sector, these
modern human resource practices are well developed.
The aim of this chapter is to explain the institutional setting and the
main actors of wage determination in the Netherlands, to investigate the
inﬂuence of the centralized bargaining system on the Dutch wage struc-
ture, and to see to what extent individual factors, developments at the ﬁrm
level, and market developments determine wages. We will also relate wage
developments to worker mobility, as this may be a way in which workers
respond to rigid wage structures. The analyses are based on administra-
tive data collected by Statistics Netherlands (CBS) from various sources,
bringing together wage information about all employment relationships
held in the Netherlands. Currently this data set covers the period 1999 to
2003. Our main ﬁndings for this period were that the Netherlands clearly
experienced an increase in wage inequality, especially among men. This
pattern was very similar when comparing ﬁrms of diﬀerent size, while 
speciﬁc industries revealed patterns that substantially deviated from the
overall pattern. Young people in all wage categories faced, on average,
much higher wage increases than others. Decomposing the wage growth
into an industry component, a ﬁrm component, and an individual compo-
nent showed that by far most of the variation in wage growth was individ-
ual. On average, only 12 percent of the variance was ﬁrm speciﬁc. Industry-
speciﬁc wage growth was almost negligible. In smaller ﬁrms, however, the
development of wages was much more ﬁrm speciﬁc. Mobility rates were
relatively high among workers in ﬁrms with low wage growth as well as
ﬁrms with high wage growth. This relationship exists when we look at dif-
ferences both between and within industries in the wage development of a
ﬁrm.
The period of investigation was characterized by relatively high wage
growth (Ter Weel 2003). Although economic performance was already de-
teriorating after the boom in the late 1990s, the labor market was still
heated, especially because of shortages for higher-educated workers in
general and low-skilled workers in some speciﬁc industries (especially the
building industry [ROA 2005]). Our ﬁndings, therefore, suggest that wage
formation in the Netherlands—at least in this period—was determined
mainly by the development of the scarcity of human capital on the one
hand, and by individual career developments on the other. Neither collec-
tive agreements nor the proﬁtability of ﬁrms seemed to have great eﬀects.
We will proceed as follows in this chapter. In section 4.2, we will provide
a detailed description of the institutional actors and processes of wage de-
termination in the Netherlands and economic conditions in the period in-
vestigated. In section 4.3, we will describe the data. Section 4.4 provides the
results of the analyses, and section 4.5 contains our conclusions.
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4.2.1 Characteristics of the Dutch Economy
The Dutch economy is a corporative economy in which the government,
employers’ associations, and trade unions are focused on deliberation and
consensus. It can be characterized as a capitalist state of the Rhineland
model. The model is based on a regulated market economy and an exten-
sive system of social security. The government, the employers’ associa-
tions, and the trade unions negotiate about goals and appropriate mea-
sures to reach these goals. One of the main aims is sustainable and socially
responsible economic growth. Social responsibility and solidarity are
some of the main characteristics of this state model.
Until 1982, the Dutch economy was often called the “welfare state with-
out work.” In 1982, 13 percent of the Dutch labor force was unemployed,
and almost the same number were on social welfare programs, especially
early retirement and disability programs. The broad unemployment rate
was 28 percent of the labor force (Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development [OECD] 1982). Since 1982, the Dutch economy tackled
its labor market problems by applying strict wage moderation, welfare re-
form, activating labor market policies, and measures to increase labor mar-
ket ﬂexibility.
From the 1990s onward, the performance of the Dutch economy im-
proved substantially. Some authors refer to wage moderation as the main
explanation (Dur 2001; Den Butter and Mosch 2003), others argue that 
the ﬂexibility of the economy was the main cause (Hartog 1999; Broersma,
Koeman, and Teulings 2000), while the third explanation could be that the
composition of the Dutch industrial landscape, with many people working
in the service industry, explains the favorable situation (OECD 2006).
4.2.2 Wage Negotiations
The legal framework of Dutch industrial relations was put in place in the
1930s. As a consequence of the recession between the wars, the collective
agreement received public protection as a measure against unfettered wage
competition. After 1945, the role of the state expanded, and for two decades
the Netherlands maintained a statutory wage policy. This policy was linked
closely to the central union and employers’ federations: the Stichting van de
Arbeid1 (STAR), the bipartite Foundation of Labor in which unions and
employers have been meeting since 1945; and the Sociaal Economische
Raad2 (SER), the government’s main advisory council on social and eco-
nomic policies.
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1. The English translation is “The Labor Foundation.”
2. The English translation is “The Social and Economic Council of the Netherlands.”A new wage act in 1970 deprived the government of part of its power.
From that time onward, the government was only supposed to intervene
during a stalemate of negotiations or to suspend contracts. Nevertheless,
between 1973 and 1982, these powers were used seven times, so wage ne-
gotiations in that time could hardly be described as bipartite. 1982 was said
to be the year of the return to voluntary wage moderation without the
threat of government intervention. Dutch unions, although weakened by
severe job and membership crises of the early 1980s (Van den Berg 1998)
but assured of continued institutional support, have publicly chosen a
“jobs before wages” strategy (Visser and Hemerijk 1998).
Actual negotiations on contracts and wages are traditionally done by sec-
tor in the Netherlands. This means that for each trade or sector, a separate
collective agreement (CAO) is made. However, the trade unions and ﬁrms
negotiating in a sector or trade are either directly or indirectly guided by
their respective central organization. These central organizations are the
actors in the national debate on targets, goals, and aims of the bargaining
process, set forth in the agreements at the end of every year. This combina-
tion of centralized “prebargaining” and goal-setting, combined with decen-
tralized negotiating over the actual form of the new wage contracts, leads to
ﬂexibility without overlooking the macroeconomic repercussions of sec-
toral wage contracts for the rest of the economy. In the context of “global-
ization,” the trend in the Netherlands was to give more leeway to bargain-
ing within a sector to allow for necessary variation across sectors.
The setup of organizations implies that macroeconomic conditions pro-
vide major feedback on wage formation. A typical example is the “Was-
senaar Agreement” of 1982, which marked the starting point of wage 
moderation. Instead of a collective agreement, it was an agreement of the
centralized trade unions, employers’ associations, and the government to
implement wage moderation in the collective agreements of the coming
year. This was to be the general framework for the collective agreements in
diﬀerent sectors.
Traditionally, the Dutch had tripartite negotiations. Since 1982, negoti-
ations can be called bipartite. But even if the government oﬃcially is no
longer a direct partner in the bargaining process, the public and political
debate plays an important role in the results of the negotiations. The dis-
tance between the negotiators is small by any means—physically, socially,
and—since the 1980s—also ideologically.
Close cooperation of the parties involved has been institutionalized in
the Netherlands through the existence of numerous foundations, councils,
committees, and commissions in which parties meet regularly. Because 
of this system and the small size of the country, trade partners know each
other, and meetings may take place in an informal manner. The most 
important institutions in this context are the aforementioned STAR and
the SER.
128 Lex Borghans and Ben KriechelThe STAR was founded 1945 as a private committee by trade union con-
federations and employers’ associations. Its goal was to create a common
meeting point to discuss issues relating to social security, pensions, taxes,
and wage formation. The STAR publishes proposals and agreements guid-
ing the annual contractual wage negotiations. Part of its advisory function
is even laid down in law.3The SER is a meeting point for members of STAR
with the cabinet and was founded 1950 as an organization under public law
and part of a corporatist civil order of the economy. The SER is also the
most important council for the government in social and economic issues.
The organization of SER is tripartite. Employers and employees each have
eleven seats; another eleven seats are for independent members appointed
by the government.
The organization of employees in trade unions started between 1905 and
1920, but they were not accepted as negotiation partners for collective bar-
gaining until the 1920s. Today, union membership in the Netherlands is
quite low. Nevertheless, a broad majority agrees with the unions’ policies.
In the Netherlands, there are four trade union federations that cover all
sectors. Representing 63 percent of all union members, the Dutch Trade
Federation (FNV, Federatie Nederlandse Vakbeweging) is the most impor-
tant one, followed by the Christian National Trade Federation (CNV,
Christelijk Nationaal Vakverbond), representing 18 percent of all members,
the General Trade Federation (AVC, Algemene Vakcentrale), and the Trade
Federation for Higher Employees and Senior Oﬃcials (MHP, Vakcentrale
voor Middelbaar en Hoger Personeel), both with 9 percent of the total num-
ber of members. Trade unions need to cooperate during negotiations to
avoid the threat of being excluded. Trade unions are subdivided into units
per sector. The largest trade union in this respect is the one for civil ser-
vants; the leading trade union within the negotiations is still the industrial
federation (IB).
Even though the federations share the same goal, they diﬀer in terms of
tradition, religion, and ideology. This diﬀerentiation is still a relic from the
times of the denominationalism of Dutch society until the seventies. The
FNV is a result of a merger of the socialist and the Catholic sections,
whereas the CNV’s roots are in the Protestant denomination. The impor-
tant goals of all trade unions include employment growth, wage modera-
tion, reduction of working hours, preventing high wage spread between
companies and sectors, and preserving a proper social security system.
The degree of membership among employers is quite high; 60 to 70 per-
cent of all employees in the private sector work in companies that are
members of an employers’ organization. Of all Dutch employees, 83 per-
cent are covered by a collective contract, 14 percent by company contracts
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3. The Minister for Social Services and Employment formally has to ask for advice if there
is disagreement on the general nature (sanctioning) of a CAO.(very large companies such as Phillips have their own agreements), while 69
percent are covered by sectoral contracts. In the Netherlands, there are three
main employers’ associations: Verbond van Nederlandse Ondernemingen-
Nederlands Christelijke Werkgeversverbond (VNO-NCW) for large 
companies, Midden-en Kleinbedrijf (MKB) for small and medium-sized
companies, and Land-en tuinbouworganisatie (LTO) Nederland for the
agricultural sector.
Despite the decentralization of 1993, many ties can still be found be-
tween the approximately 5,000 negotiators involved in bargaining for the
720 collective agreements (Visser and Hemerijk 1998). The bargaining and
agreement process typically goes through several stages (de Kam, van
Drimmelen, and van Hulst 1994).
The ﬁrst stage is in the summer of each year. When all collective agree-
ments for the current year have been settled, claims for the coming year
start to emerge. This is also to inﬂuence the government in its budget plan-
ning for the coming year.
The second stage consists of discussions and negotiations within STAR
and SER. If these negotiations are successful, they lead to a central agree-
ment within STAR, which provides general guidelines for the sectoral ne-
gotiations.
The third stage, usually at the beginning of the new year, is then the ac-
tual negotiations for each sector.4These negotiations result in the ﬁnal con-
tractual agreements. The federation usually sets out some guidelines,
which are then detailed by the negotiators for the diﬀerent sectors and lev-
els of negotiation.
The government has the possibility of sanctioning the CAO result, mak-
ing it binding for all workers involved. This means that even nonunionized
employees and ﬁrms have to follow the stipulated contract. This is usually
done because the CAOs are almost always transferred into law, thus be-
coming binding for all workers in the sector.
Government inﬂuence on wage formation has a long tradition in the
Netherlands. Between 1945 and 1970, Dutch wage policies were controlled
by the state. All agreements had to be submitted to a body of experts ap-
pointed by the government. Agreements became eﬀective after acceptance
by this body. Even after 1970, when a new wage law came into force that re-
turned responsibility for wage setting to employers and employees, the state
was able to inﬂuence wage negotiations in the case of an “economic emer-
gency situation.” As mentioned in the preceding, such an “emergency” oc-
curred seven times in the twelve years between 1970 to 1982. Most of the
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4. Actually, the term “sector” is not entirely correct, because collective agreements are not
necessarily negotiated for sectors or industrial branches but can also be on the ﬁrm level. The
units of collective agreements developed historically and are mutually accepted. They usually
follow some sector (e.g., chemical industry), but some ﬁrms, such as AKZO, have their own
ﬁrm-level CAO agreement.state interventions were necessary because employees and employers were
unable to agree. It was not until the Wassenaar Agreement in 1982 that
trade partners became autonomous in their wage setting. The power of the
government to threaten with state intervention if trade partners could not
reach an agreement in their negotiations forced the partners to ﬁnd a com-
promise. The possibility of government intervention enabled the trade
unions to explain unpopular wage agreements to their members.
At the central level, government is very much involved in Dutch wage ne-
gotiations. It is a participant in the discussion on general agreements
through the SER, even though it is not directly involved in the drafting of
the agreements in the STAR. Through changes in taxes and the social se-
curity system, which is set out in the government’s budget (Miljoenennota),
it also inﬂuences both the general agreements and the ﬁnal sectoral collec-
tive agreements. These changes must be implemented through the political
process and approved by parliament.
At the sectoral level, the government also plays the role of a moderator.
For example, the government pointed out that unemployment beneﬁts
could not be maintained at the current level if agreed wage increases were
too high, as this could lead to a further rise of unemployment. This under-
lines the solidarity aspect of Dutch culture. Another example is that the
government has been lowering the wedge between wage costs and net
wages in order to support wage moderation. The government has also re-
strained wages of civil servants and related employees to a great extent. Di-
rect government involvement follows from the fact that it has to sanction
collective agreements at the sectoral level.5After government sanctioning,
agreements become binding for all those employed in the sector concerned.
So even though only about 20 percent of the workers are trade union mem-
bers, these unions bargain on behalf of all workers and even represent the
unemployed. The system of collective agreements that are sanctioned by
government, as well as government participation in negotiations and con-
sultations at the central level, is supported explicitly by employers and
employees. One of the results is social stability: strikes are very rare in the
Netherlands. In addition, the rather implicit role of the government en-
sures that agreements are based on consensus. Consequently, wage drift is
relatively small in the Netherlands.
4.2.3 Wage Flexibility
The institutional setting suggests quite strict and similar wage develop-
ments, at least within (sub)sectors. There are, however, reasons why there
may be more wage ﬂexibility in practice than these institutional circum-
stances would suggest.
An important reason is that centrally bargained agreements typically
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5. Since 1997, sectoral agreements no longer need to be sanctioned.have an inﬂuence on the wage scales and wage grades that companies use.
This shifting of the scales would lead to an equal rise in workers’ wages if
all workers remained at the same position in these scales. However, the
main part of workers’ wage development comes from their careers, within
or across ﬁrms. Throughout their careers, workers move up the wage
grades and scales, which leads to higher average wage increases than those
that are centrally agreed upon. An example is given in Dohmen (2004): in
a large manufacturing ﬁrm in the Netherlands, workers move up wage
grades and scales, while the underlying matrix of scales are shifted to ac-
commodate centrally agreed wage changes. Many Dutch ﬁrms apply mod-
ern human resource practices, with performance interviews determining
the position of a worker on the wage scale.
Another reason for ﬂexible and divergent development in pay in the
Netherlands is the prevalent use of incentive pay. This incentive pay is
linked to either quantitative performance measures or qualitative evalua-
tions. At least part of the pay is thus linked to objective or subjective eval-
uations of performance. Borghans and Kriechel (2006) give an overview of
the use of incentive pay and its inﬂuence on the moments of wage distribu-
tion. They show that the use of incentive pay is quite high across most sec-
tors and that the introduction of incentive pay has had an inﬂuence on the
distribution within ﬁrms. Stegeman (2000) also reports that many Dutch
ﬁrms use some kind of incentive pay.
4.2.4 Economic Development in 1999 to 2003
In the late 1990s, the Dutch economy was booming, partly as a result of
international developments in the information technology (IT) sector. Un-
employment decreased rapidly. As the increase in the supply of higher-
educated workers diminished while their demand increased, the labor mar-
ket position of this group improved. Among lower- and intermediately
educated workers, the main increase in demand was in the building indus-
try, which experienced a rapid increase in employment of 20 percent be-
tween 1996 and 2001 (ROA 2005).
Table 4.1 provides some basic statistics about the development of the la-
bor market in the period 1996 to 2005.6The table shows that until 2000, the
Dutch economy was doing quite well. Annual gross domestic product
(GDP) growth was around 3 percent for some time. Because unemploy-
ment was at a high level in the 1980s and, in particular, higher-educated
workers had a poor labor market position, it took some time before
scarcity was felt in the labor market. In 1998, ﬁrms started to have prob-
lems recruiting higher-educated workers, vacancy rates increased, and
132 Lex Borghans and Ben Kriechel
6. The main analysis in section 4.3 is performed for the time period 1999–2003. We have in-
cluded the other years to show the developments that have led to the examined time period.




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































eunemployment dropped. The period of 1998 to 2002 was characterized by
relatively high wage increases as a response to these developments.
The contractual wage increase indicates the wage increase that workers
would receive if the collective agreements were the only cause for a change
in wages. In practice, however, workers also experience wage increases due
to promotion, change of job, and incidental increases in pay because of
good performance. The table shows that contractual wage increases were
large from 1998 until 2003. In 2001, 2002, and 2003, these contractual in-
creases were actually larger than the growth of GDP. Usually the inciden-
tal component in wage increases equals approximately 0.7, but employers
use the possibilities of incidental increases as instruments in the competi-
tion for workers. This was obviously the case in 2000 and 2001, which were
years characterized by high vacancy rates. The unemployment rate also de-
creased until 2001 and started to increase from 2002 onward.
4.3 Data and Variables
The analyses in this chapter are based on administrative sources col-
lected by Statistics Netherlands. We have used two administrative data sets.
First, the Gemeentelijke Basisadministratie (GBA) contains information
about the demographic characteristics and household compositions of all
inhabitants of the Netherlands. The data origin from the register is kept
within the municipalities. Because all Dutch municipalities use the same
uniﬁed system for their registers, this joint database is a useful basis for
linking various sources. From the GBA, we have used the gender and age
of the person.
The second source that we have used is the Social Statistical Database of
Jobs (SSB Banenbestand). In this data set, Statistics Netherlands has com-
bined information about all Dutch employment relationships from various
administrative sources. The two main sources are the social insurance ad-
ministration (Verzekeringsadministratie werknemers [VZA]) and the ﬁscal
database (Fibase), which collects information on income taxes. Statistics
Netherlands has combined the diﬀerent sources, veriﬁed the information
from the diﬀerent sources, and developed decision rules to combine infor-
mation in case of inconsistencies. Cases in the database that appear not to
reﬂect a real employment relationship, but are merely ﬁnancial transac-
tions, have been excluded. An example of this could be a mistake that has
been made in the salary of a former employee. Later, when the ﬁrm pays the
remaining salary, this appears in the administration as a one-day employ-
ment relationship with a relatively high salary.
The data is employment-based, so every employment relationship is an
observation. Because workers may move from one ﬁrm to another within
a year and may have multiple employment relationships simultaneously,
there are more employment relationships than workers. The data set con-
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event history and annual data set. For each change in employment rela-
tionships, a new observation is generated. Wages, however, are included 
on an annual basis for each employment relationship separately. Wage
changes or a change of job within a ﬁrm will not lead to a new observation,
but wages earned in diﬀerent ﬁrms are registered separately.
4.3.1 Wages
Within the SSB, the wage information is based on administrative data
from the insurance and ﬁscal authorities. The data set contains all wage
earners living in the Netherlands, with their annual incomes.7The incomes
should be regarded as ﬁscal, gross salaries. Included in the information
from the tax oﬃces are also the number of days a worker has worked.
For some counts (e.g., ﬁrm size) a ﬁxed date within a year had to be cho-
sen. We decided to “cut” the data at a speciﬁc date. We have used the third
Thursday in September, avoiding cut points that have administrative sig-
niﬁcance or cut points that happen to fall in weekends or major vacations.
For the subsequent analysis, in cases where multiple employment relation-
ships for a single worker existed, only the employment relationship within
one year that generated the highest income was used for a worker.8
We used the gross ﬁscal annual wages and the number of days a worker
was reported to have worked in order to calculate the gross monthly wages
in euros. We were unable to control for working hours, but we were able to
adjust for the number of days employed within a year.9 Wage diﬀerences
were simple deductions of the previous year’s wage of the current wage.
It is possible to match various administrative sources using the ID num-
ber (SOFI-nummer, i.e., the social security number) of people working 
or living in the Netherlands. For privacy reasons, Statistics Netherlands
transforms this ID number into the so-called registrant identiﬁcation num-
ber (RIN) number. In this way, personal information can still be matched,
but users of the ﬁle cannot search for the social security number of a spe-
ciﬁc person.
4.3.2 Tenure
Tenure can be measured accurately. It is calculated on the basis of the
day of entry into a ﬁrm, which is known in the data. We have calculated the
tenure in years based on the cutoﬀ point in September.
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7. The self-employed are not included in this database. Statistics Netherlands is currently
developing a similar but separate database for this speciﬁc group.
8. An exception is made for the exit and entry rates. These are based on all contracts within
a year.
9. Average monthly working hours are reported only for a nonrepresentative subset of the
population. Using working hours would halve the population used.4.3.3 Demographics
The age of a worker is known through the year and month of birth that
is available in the data. In addition, there is information on gender, house-
hold composition, and changes of a person’s address based on the munici-
pal database.
4.3.4 Firm
Firms are identiﬁed by a ﬁrm ID. The deﬁnition of a ﬁrm is based on an
economic deﬁnition developed by Statistics Netherlands. When a holding
consists of units that are fairly independent in their daily management,
these units are considered to be separate ﬁrms.
4.3.5 Mobility
Worker mobility was measured by the number of contracts, with a min-
imum duration of ninety days, ending within the year. We excluded the pro-
longation of year-to-year contracts. While most workers have only one
contract at a time, it is possible that a worker has several employment con-
tracts simultaneously. Thus, a single worker can, in principal, cause several
“exits” within a year.
4.3.6 Selection of the Data
For the analyses, we used only information about employees who were
employed for at least three months and had an annual income in excess of
one fourth of the annual minimum wage. This excluded short-term con-
tracts and those that contained only very few hours a week. Furthermore,
because we are especially interested in diﬀerences in wages between work-
ers in the same ﬁrm, we excluded from the analyses all workers in ﬁrms with
less than ten workers.
4.4 Results
The data allow us to investigate the wage structure, wage changes, and
mobility patterns of the Dutch economy in the period of 1999 to 2003. Due
to the associated ﬁrm employee character of the data, the wage structure
within the ﬁrm can be compared to the overall wage structure.
Table 4.2 presents summary statistics for the distribution of individual
wages and the distribution of mean wages of ﬁrms. Because smaller ﬁrms
pay on average substantially lower wages than larger ﬁrms, the wage levels
of the average ﬁrm is lower than the corresponding levels among individu-
als. Of course, inequality is greater among individuals than among ﬁrms.
The standard deviation among individuals is about twice the standard de-
viation of mean wages in ﬁrms.
Table 4.3 summarizes the wage distributions within ﬁrms. On average,
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.the coeﬃcient of variation within ﬁrms is below the national coeﬃcient of
variation. About 25 percent of the ﬁrms, however, had a higher wage in-
equality than the national average, as the 75th percentile equals about this
national coeﬃcient of variation of 0.6, as can be found in table 4.2.
Table 4.4 compares the within-ﬁrm wage distribution with the overall
wage distribution. It conﬁrms that for the average ﬁrm, the standard devi-
ation of wages is about half the overall standard deviation of wages. Be-
cause ﬁrms with a higher average pay also have higher standard deviations,
the ﬁrms with high wage inequality have about the same inequality as the
overall distribution here.
In table 4.5, we take a look at the wage growth measured as the change
in log wages. The growth ﬁgures approximately reﬂect the macroﬁgures
presented in section 4.2. As smaller ﬁrms especially increased wages be-
tween 2001 and 2002, we found large increases at ﬁrm level in this period.
Both at the individual level and at the ﬁrm level, the 10th percentile of the
annual change is negative, with the exception of the period 2001 to 2002 at
ﬁrm level. Because the wages are not deﬂated, this reveals that a substan-
tial fraction of ﬁrms and individuals faced wage decreases every year.
In table 4.6, we present the distribution of exit rates over time. This is
done separately for all ﬁrms, in the ﬁrst column of a year, and for large
ﬁrms with 100 employees or more in the second column of a year. In gen-
eral, the exit rates diminish from 2000 to 2003, starting at a median of 23.66
percent in 2000 and ending at 17 percent in 2003. This reduction is mainly
due to ﬁrms at the upper end of the distribution—that is, with the highest
exit rates, which is lowered over time. Large ﬁrms consistently have 2 to 3
percent lower-than-average exit rates. The exit rate by the position of a ﬁrm
in the wage distribution shows that the higher exit rates are generated by
the lower-paying ﬁrms.
The increase in wages was not distributed equally among workers. To in-
vestigate the development of wages in greater detail, we split the sample in
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Table 4.3 Distribution of the coeﬃcient of variation within ﬁrms
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Median CV 0.4831 0.4886 0.4910 0.4904 0.4832
Mean CV 0.5055 0.5116 0.5148 0.5133 0.5081
Standard deviation of CV 0.2073 0.2042 0.2064 0.2049 0.2096
P90 CV 0.7487 0.7525 0.7631 0.7613 0.7580
P75 CV 0.6036 0.6104 0.6145 0.6160 0.6107
P25 CV 0.3752 0.3820 0.3835 0.3793 0.3723
P10 CV 0.2845 0.2907 0.2902 0.2874 0.2817
Source: Own calculations based on the job ﬁles from the Social Statistical Database (SSB)
made available by Statistics Netherlands (CBS).
Note: CV   coeﬃcient of variation.99 percentile groups, based on wages in 2001, with all workers in the 0.5 
to 1.5 percentile in the ﬁrst group, all workers in the 1.5 to 2.5 percentile in
the second group, and so on. When comparing diﬀerent groups, we keep
these brackets constant. Figure 4.1provides the change in wages from 2000
to 2002. Because the percentile groups are based on wages in 2001, we
avoided reversal to the mean eﬀects due to measurement error or inciden-
tal changes in wages.
The ﬁgure compares wage growth of men and women. It shows that
there is a general tendency for an increase in wage inequality as wages for
workers with high incomes grew more than wages for low-wage workers.
This holds especially for men. For women we observed an above-average
wage increase for the group in between the 5th and the 40th percentile.
Figure 4.2 makes a similar comparison between age groups. As can be
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Table 4.4 Comparison of overall wage distribution with wage distributions within the ﬁrm
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Firm mean SD/country SD 0.5987 0.5839 0.6056 0.6393 0.5715
Firm SD/country mean 0.3067 0.3348 0.3595 0.3383 0.4001
90/10 within ﬁrm to 90/10 of country 0.1624 0.1615 0.1530 0.1495 0.1472
90/10 of ﬁrm means to 90/10 of country 0.8637 0.8536 0.8618 0.8685 0.8657
Within ﬁrm 90% SD relative to the country SD 0.9436 0.9102 0.9566 1.0214 0.9058
Within ﬁrm 10% SD relative to the country SD 0.2892 0.2847 0.2880 0.3065 0.2697
Between ﬁrm 90% relative to country 90% 0.7086 0.7051 0.7128 0.7200 0.7281
Between ﬁrm 10% relative to country 10% 0.8204 0.8260 0.8271 0.8290 0.8411
Source: Own calculations based on the job ﬁles from the Social Statistical Database (SSB) made avail-
able by Statistics Netherlands (CBS).
Note: SD   standard deviation.
Table 4.5 Distribution of the annual change of individual log wage and the mean log wage
within ﬁrms
Individuals Firms
1999– 2000– 2001– 2002– 1999– 2000– 2001– 2002–
2000 2001 2002 2003 2000 2001 2002 2003
Median 0.046 0.063 0.048 0.038 0.058 0.069 0.135 0.046
Mean 0.058 0.075 0.060 0.045 0.061 0.071 0.162 0.047
Standard deviation 0.188 0.199 0.195 0.204 0.145 0.151 0.127 0.143
P90 0.193 0.217 0.196 0.175 0.171 0.184 0.310 0.148
P75 0.097 0.116 0.098 0.829 0.103 0.114 0.211 0.086
P25 0.013 0.025 0.011 0.002 0.022 0.028 0.077 0.012
P10 –0.050 –0.038 –0.055 –0.063 –0.032 –0.031 0.040 –0.039
Source: Own calculations based on the job ﬁles from the Social Statistical Database (SSB) made avail-











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.Fig. 4.1 Average wage growth between 2000 and 2002 for male and female em-
ployees for 99 percentile groups of the Dutch wage distribution
Source: Own calculations based on the Job ﬁles from the Social Statistical Database (SSB)
made available by Statistics Netherlands (CBS).
Fig. 4.2 Average wage growth between 2000 and 2002 for employees in diﬀerent
age categories for 99 percentile groups of the Dutch wage distribution
Source: Own calculations based on the Job ﬁles from the Social Statistical Database (SSB)
made available by Statistics Netherlands (CBS).expected, young workers faced larger wage increases than older workers.
This diﬀerence was also very substantial, however, when comparing these
ﬁgures internationally (Lazear and Shaw 2006). Another interesting fea-
ture of the graph is that the wage increase for young workers was high com-
pared to other workers in all percentile groups. This implies that young
workers who already earned wages that were very high with respect to the
overall wage distribution experienced wage increases far beyond the wage
increase of older workers with the same wages.
In ﬁgure 4.3, diﬀerent ﬁrm sizes are compared. Although wages are
strongly correlated with ﬁrm size, the surprising ﬁnding here is that the
growth of wages—conditional on the wage level—is very similar for all size
groups. This result is clearly consistent with a human capital interpretation
of wages. When smaller ﬁrms pay lower wages because they hire people
with lower levels of human capital, but wages only depend on the value of
human capital in the market, the change in wages should be the same for
all types of ﬁrms when conditioning on the wage level.
These ﬁndings changed completely when we compared diﬀerent indus-
tries. Figures 4.4to 4.6provide the wage growth patterns for ten broad clus-
ters of industries. There are some clear diﬀerences between industries. Es-
pecially the building industry has a pattern that deviates from the rest.
Workers with wages in the lower percentiles of the Dutch wage distribution
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Fig. 4.3 Average wage growth between 2000 and 2002 for employees in various
ﬁrm-size categories for 99 percentile groups of the Dutch wage distribution
Source: Own calculations based on the Job ﬁles from the Social Statistical Database (SSB)
made available by Statistics Netherlands (CBS).experienced wage increases that are comparable to the wage increases of
the top earners in this industry. Employment in the building industry was
expanding rapidly in the period 1996 to 2001, so this wage pattern seems to
reﬂect the increased demand for low-skilled workers in this industry.
The ﬁndings, therefore, suggest that the structure of wages in the Nether-
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Fig. 4.4 Average wage growth between 2000 and 2002 for employees in agricul-
ture, food and textile industry, chemical and metal industry, and other industries for
99 percentile groups of the Dutch wage distribution
Source: Own calculations based on the Job ﬁles from the Social Statistical Database (SSB)
made available by Statistics Netherlands (CBS).
Fig. 4.5 Average wage growth between 2000 and 2002 for employees in the build-
ing industry, retail and catering, and ﬁnancial services and transport for 99 per-
centile groups of the Dutch wage distribution
Source: Own calculations based on the Job ﬁles from the Social Statistical Database (SSB)
made available by Statistics Netherlands (CBS).lands is largely related to changes in the scarcity and value of human cap-
ital. A remaining question is to what extent these developments are corre-
lated at the ﬁrm level and how much they can vary at the individual level.
For this reason, we decomposed the wage increase in the period 2001 to
2002 in industry eﬀects, ﬁrm eﬀects, and individual eﬀects. The ﬁrst col-
umn of table 4.7 provides the variance of wages if each worker had experi-
enced the same (relative) wage increase within each industry. For these
analyses, we used the two-digit industry classiﬁcation, which consists of
ﬁfty-seven diﬀerent industries. The second column gives the variance of
wages, assuming that each worker faced the average wage increase within
his ﬁrm. The third column provides the individual variance of wages.
Based on this, the contribution to the wage inequality can be split into
an industry component, a ﬁrm component, and an individual component,
as is shown in columns (4) to (6) of the table. These tables provide the cor-
responding ﬁgures for splits of the data in diﬀerent dimensions.
Overall, an interesting observation is that there was very little variation
in wage growth between industries. This implies that either the agreements
at the national level dominated the collective agreements at the industrial
level or that these collective agreements played only a very small role in
wage determination.
Wage growth diﬀerences at the ﬁrm level contributed on average for 12
percent to the diﬀerences in wage growth. The remaining 87 percent of the
variation referred to individual diﬀerences. Wage growth in the Nether-
lands was thus mainly determined at the individual level. For men, the in-
dividual component was larger than for women. Diﬀerences between age
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Fig. 4.6 Average wage growth between 2000 and 2002 for employees in public ad-
ministration and other services, education and care, and culture for 99 percentile
groups of the Dutch wage distribution
Source: Own calculations based on the Job ﬁles from the Social Statistical Database (SSB)
made available by Statistics Netherlands (CBS).groups are very small. A substantial diﬀerence in this respect was found
when we compared ﬁrms of diﬀerent sizes. In the smallest ﬁrms, of ten to
nineteen employees, 36 percent of the variation in wages was at the ﬁrm
level, while in the large ﬁrms of more than 1,000 employees, this is only 4
percent. This suggests that in small ﬁrms, which are in general less involved
in negotiations for collective agreements, there was a strong tendency to
give all workers approximately the same wage increase. In large ﬁrms,
which sometimes even have their own collective agreement, not much of a
ﬁrm eﬀect was observed. Column (2) shows that this diﬀerence was to a
large part due to the variation in average wage increases at the ﬁrm level.
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Table 4.7 Decomposition of the variance of wage growth 2001–2002 in between-industry,





industries ﬁrms individuals Industry Firm Individual
Overall 0.00022 0.00310 0.02456 0.89 11.73 87.38
Gender
Male 0.00018 0.00258 0.02405 0.74 10.00 89.26
Female 0.00026 0.00366 0.02506 1.05 13.56 85.39
Age
 25 0.00022 0.00423 0.03019 0.74 13.25 86.00
26–35 0.00029 0.00433 0.03392 0.86 11.90 87.24
36–45 0.00024 0.00315 0.02368 1.01 12.29 86.70
46–55 0.00019 0.00249 0.01629 1.19 14.09 84.71
55  0.00019 0.00252 0.01681 1.15 13.87 84.98
Firm size
10–19 0.00026 0.01147 0.03100 0.82 36.17 63.01
20–49 0.00025 0.00802 0.03034 0.83 25.60 73.57
50–99 0.00025 0.00580 0.02936 0.86 18.90 80.24
100–499 0.00021 0.00281 0.02557 0.81 10.20 88.99
500–999 0.00024 0.00239 0.02501 0.95 8.61 90.45
1,000  0.00024 0.00103 0.02102 1.16 3.72 95.12
Industry
0 Agriculture 0.00004 0.00523 0.02376 0.18 21.83 77.99
1 Food and textile industry 0.00010 0.00306 0.02150 0.47 13.76 85.77
2 Chemical and metal industry 0.00007 0.00264 0.01981 0.38 12.95 86.67
3 Other industry 0.00007 0.00246 0.01640 0.43 14.59 84.97
4 Building industry 0.00007 0.00420 0.02309 0.30 17.90 81.80
5 Retail and catering 0.00010 0.00470 0.02774 0.37 16.57 83.06
6 Financial services and transport 0.00049 0.00390 0.02907 1.69 11.71 86.59
7 Governance and other services 0.00029 0.00360 0.02869 1.03 11.52 87.45
8 Education and care 0.00000 0.00142 0.02140 0.01 6.64 93.34
9 Culture 0.00006 0.00524 0.02962 0.20 17.48 82.32
Source: Own calculations based on the job ﬁles from the Social Statistical Database (SSB) made avail-
able by Statistics Netherlands (CBS).There is much more variation between wage increases of smaller ﬁrms than
between larger ﬁrms.
At the sectoral level (one-digit) the highest ﬁrm-speciﬁc components
were observed in agriculture. In education and care, the between-ﬁrm vari-
ation was much smaller than in other industries. Here, apparently, ﬁrms
followed national agreements in wage growth more closely than in other
industries.
Apart from negotiating wages with their current employers, employees
can of course also inﬂuence their wages by changing employer. To investi-
gate whether wage developments at sector and ﬁrm levels were related to
exit rates, we calculated for each worker the diﬀerence between the average
wage increase in his or her sector or ﬁrm and the average economywide
wage increase. We used only wage increases for workers who did not
change ﬁrm. We determined 99 percentile groups, varying from very low
relative wage growth in the sector or ﬁrm (0.5 to 1.5th percentile) to very
high relative wage growth in the sector or ﬁrm (98.5 to 99.5th percentile).
The thin line in ﬁgure 4.7 provides the exit rates for these 99 groups as a
function of the sectoral wage growth. The dashed line provides a similar
line for ﬁrm-level wage growth. The ﬁgure reveals that the exit rate in ﬁrms
that experienced a relative decrease in wages was higher as the diﬀerence in
wage development was larger. On the other hand, ﬁrms that paid higher
wage increases than other ﬁrms in the same industry also experienced more
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Fig. 4.7 Job mobility in 2001 related to the wage development in a sector or ﬁrm
relative to the overall wage growth
Source: Own calculations based on the Job ﬁles from the Social Statistical Database (SSB)
made available by Statistics Netherlands (CBS).mobility when the diﬀerence in wage development was large. At the sector
level, we found a similar pattern.
4.5 Conclusions
In this chapter, we documented the wage structure and labor mobility of
the Dutch labor market between 1999 and 2003. The analyses are based on
the administrative records collected by Statistics Netherlands that became
available recently. The data allow for detailed descriptions of the wage
structure between and within ﬁrms, following workers in time.
In the period 1999 to 2003, wage inequality increased. Especially work-
ers in the lowest wage percentiles experienced lower wage increases than the
median workers, while wage increases for top earners were substantially
higher. The evidence in this chapter suggests that wage determination in the
Netherlands is to a large extent determined by market forces. Workers with
similar wages experience similar wage increases, irrespective of ﬁrm size.
Wages for low-skilled workers in industries with a large increase in demand
grow faster than in other industries, and between-industry and between-
ﬁrm variation in wages is low compared to the individual component.
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